A-06 · sources & monitoring · English summary

What the index contains —
and what it does not say.

This page summarises the French A-06 observatory. It gives the figures, the five African national lists now covered, the OpenSanctions result, and the decision that follows: do not rebuild the aggregation; keep the African analytical layer as the added value.

review: 20 October 2026 snapshot: 18 October 2026 full French page: A-06 FR guide: User guide EN

The perimeter, without rounding

Four perimeters, four different answers. The figures below come from the dated local index; they are not a global count of sanctions.

Designations
20,426
unique OFAC + UN entries
Names & aliases
43,282
comparable forms
Crypto addresses
505
published wallets, 16 assets
African entries
868
43 countries identified
PerimeterDesignationsAfrican entriesCrypto addresses
OFAC SDN19,416—505
UN Security Council1,010—0
European Union000
OpenSanctions Africa10,175—1

The European Union perimeter is not loaded in this instance. It is shown at zero, not estimated. The OpenSanctions Africa count covers five national lists and is not merged into the OFAC/UN designation count.

Piste 1 — widening the sources

OpenSanctions / yente: what it fills, what it displaces. The collection now covers 95 aggregated sanctions sources and 2,888 published wallets.

Aggregated sources
95
sanctions collection
Wallets
2,888
all perimeters
Linked to Africa
1
holder or owner country
African share
0.03 %
floor, without name matching
What it adds: five national African lists — Egypt, South Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, Kenya — and a common nomenclature.
What it does not fill: the African crypto link moves from 0 to 1 wallet out of 2,888, or 0.03 %. The gap is structural, not a collection defect.

yente (a self-hostable engine) remains the right building block to query several lists without rebuilding name matching. The public API returns 401 without a key: no request is made from this page.

Decision: do not rebuild the aggregation. Plug in yente later for the data; keep the African analytical layer as the added value.

The five national African lists

Five published datasets, 10,175 entities in total. None of them publishes a crypto address.

ListCountryEntitiesTargets
Egypt Domestic Terrorist ListEgypt7,6873,618
South Africa Targeted Financial SanctionsSouth Africa1,992991
Tunisia National Counter-Terrorism ListTunisia332166
Nigeria Sanctions ListNigeria13869
Kenya FRC Domestic Terrorism ListKenya2613

Their interest is not a flow proof: they provide names and countries that OFAC and the UN do not cover, therefore material for a future reference dataset. A name is not a wallet.

Pistes 2, 3 and 4 — from observation to a reference dataset

Three ways to rebuild the link that the lists do not publish.

Piste 2 — cross-check the blockchain

Start from a designated person, look for their addresses on-chain, then follow the flows. The A-01 tracer already shows the movements of an address; it does not attribute an identity. This step requires chain-analysis data, not a deduction from a name.

  • Done: reading the 505 published addresses and their assets.
  • To do: address → counterparty → entity graph, with source and date per edge.
  • Limit: a shared address does not designate a person.

Piste 3 — the human circuit

The information missing from the lists circulates elsewhere: platform KYC, financial intelligence units, regional mechanisms (GIABA in West Africa), suspicious transaction reports. Documenting that circuit is a public-policy recommendation, not code.

  • Done: the limit is named and linked to the source.
  • To do: map contact points by country.
  • Limit: no personal data is collected here.

Piste 4 — build the reference dataset

The real product is not one more list: it is a dated reference dataset linking person ↔ company ↔ address ↔ source, with a country/regime codebook (54 + 1), a transliteration engine, and a SHA-256 fingerprint per snapshot. The building blocks already exist: A-05 screening, A-04 BI, A-01 tracer. What is missing is the link between them — and the temporal version.

Horizons — what is done, what remains a perspective

No announced function is presented as available if it is not.

HorizonStatusWhat it means
1 · Living observatory
monitoring, alerts, time series
partialOnly one snapshot is kept (bi_history.json = 1). Daily monitoring, alerts and entry/exit detection between two dates are not implemented.
2 · Relationship graph
address ↔ entity ↔ flow
partialThe tracer reads one address and its movements. The multi-hop graph exists in A-08; the entity graph and circumvention paths are not implemented.
3 · AI that reasons
transliteration, score, assistant
deterministicArabic/Cyrillic/Greek transliteration, onomastic variants and similarity scoring are deterministic and explainable. No LLM, no opaque score, no natural-language assistant in this version.
4 · Policy and academic impact
publication, recommendation
publishedThe “zero African address” finding is published and recalculable. The recommendation to regulators (GIABA, central banks, CERTs) remains to be formalised in a dedicated note.
5 · Product / service
API, SaaS, subscription
not doneNo public API, no account, no stored data: the site is static. An “Africa-first” screening service is a perspective, not an active offer.

What to retain

The gap is the finding. Adding 95 sources and five African lists moves the African crypto link from 0 to 1 wallet out of 2,888. That is not a collection failure: it is the structural limit of official sanctions lists for the mobile-money and crypto periphery.

Sources: OFAC SDN, UN Security Council, OpenSanctions (five African national lists). Snapshot 18 October 2026; review 20 October 2026. The French A-06 page contains the live counters and the monitoring log. A-05 and A-06 consoles are currently French-language.